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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
9	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA	
10	WESTERN DIVISION	
11	DAVID SULLIVAN,	
12	Plaintiff,	No. CV 14-1737 AJW
13	<b>v.</b>	
14	CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security,	MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
15	Defendant.	
16		
17	Proceedings	
18	On March 19, 2014, plaintiff, through his counsel of record, filed this action for judicial review. A	
19	Case Management Order ("CMO") was filed on March 24, 2014. [Docket Nos. 3, 7].	
20	On October 20, 2014, plaintiff's counsel's motion to withdraw as attorney of record was granted,	
21	and plaintiff was substituted in pro se. [See Docket Nos. 15, 20-23]. The case management deadlines in	
22	the CMO were extended to give plaintiff time "in which to retain counsel if [he] wishes or be prepared to	
23	appear pro se." [Docket Nos. 20-21]. Plaintiff was ordered to file a motion for summary judgment on or	
24	before January 14, 2015. [Docket Nos. 20-21].	
25	Plaintiff did not file a timely summary judgment motion or take any other steps to prosecute this	
26	action. Accordingly, an order to show cause regarding dismissal ("OSC") was filed giving plaintiff until	
27	September 14, 2015	
28	in which to show cause, if any there be, why this case should not be dismissed for failure to	

prosecute and to comply with the court's orders. Plaintiff may attempt to show cause by filing with the Clerk of Court one or more declarations under penalty of perjury (with supporting exhibits, if needed).

Plaintiff is cautioned that failure to respond to this order or to show good cause within the time allowed may result in the dismissal of this action with or without prejudice.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

[Docket No. 24 (emphasis in original)]. Plaintiff did not respond to the OSC within the time allowed.

## **Discussion**

A district court's authority to dismiss a litigant's action for failure to prosecute or to comply with court orders is well-established. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b)<sup>1</sup>; Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-630 (1962); Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 915 (1992). "The power to invoke this sanction is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending cases and to avoid congestion in the calendar of the District Courts." Link, 370 U.S. at 629-630.

In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with court orders, a district court should consider the following five factors: "(1) the public's interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court's need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic sanctions." In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prod. Liability Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226-1228, 1234-1252 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing and applying those factors). Regardless of whether a litigant's conduct is most properly characterized as a failure to prosecute or as a failure to comply with orders, the applicable standard is the same. See, e.g., Southwest Marine Inc. v. Danzig, 217 F.3d 1128, 1138 (9th Cir. 2000) (failure to

Involuntary Dismissal; Effect. If the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order, a defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim against it. Unless the dismissal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates as an adjudication on the merits.

Rule 41(b) states:

prosecute), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1007 (2001); Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260-1261 (failure to comply with orders).

The first factor—the public's interest in the expeditious resolution of litigation—"always favors dismissal." Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 909 (2003); see In re PPA Prod. Liability Litig., 460 F.3d at 1234 ("[D]ismissal serves the public interest in expeditious resolution of litigation as well as the court's need to manage the docket when a plaintiff's noncompliance has caused the action to come to a halt, thereby allowing the plaintiff, rather than the court, to control the pace of the docket.").

The second factor—the court's need to manage its docket—also favors dismissal. <u>Computer Task</u> <u>Group, Inc. v. Brotby</u>, 364 F.3d 1112, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004) ("Where a court order is violated, the first and second factors will favor sanctions . . . ."); <u>see Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc.</u>, 356 F.3d 1058, 1063-1066 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that "resources continue to be consumed by a case sitting idly on the court's docket").

The third factor—prejudice to defendants or respondents—also weighs in favor of dismissal. In the absence of a showing to the contrary, prejudice to the defendants or respondents is presumed from unreasonable delay. <u>In re Eisen</u>, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452-1453 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing <u>Anderson v. Air West</u>, <u>Inc.</u>, 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1976)).

The fourth factor—the availability of less drastic sanctions—also supports dismissal. Plaintiff was warned that his failure to show cause or respond to the OSC within the time allowed could result in the dismissal of this action with prejudice. See In re PPA Prod. Liability Litig., 460 F.3d at 1229 (explaining that "[w]arning [the plaintiff] that failure to obey a court order will result in dismissal can itself meet the 'consideration of alternatives' requirement."); Anderson, 542 F.2d at 525 ("There is no requirement that every single alternative remedy be examined by the court before the sanction of dismissal is appropriate. The reasonable exploration of possible and meaningful alternatives is all that is required.").

The fifth factor—the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits—weighs against dismissal, as it always does. <u>Pagtalunan v. Galaza</u>, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing <u>Hernandez v.</u>

City of El Monte, 138 F.3d 393, 399 (9th Cir. 1998)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 909 (2003). Despite the policy favoring disposition on the merits, however, it remains a litigant's responsibility to comply with orders issued by the court, "to move towards that disposition at a reasonable pace, and to refrain from dilatory and evasive tactics." In re Eisen, 31 F.3d at 1454 (quoting Morris v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 942 F.2d 648, 652 (9th Cir. 1991)). Plaintiff has not fulfilled that obligation.

The five-factor test is a disjunctive balancing test, so not all five factors must support dismissal. <u>See Valley Eng'rs Inc. v. Electric Eng'g Co.</u>, 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that the five-factor test "amounts to a way for a district judge to think about what to do, not a series of conditions precedent" to dismissal), <u>cert. denied</u>, 526 U.S. 1064 (1999); <u>Hernandez</u>, 138 F.3d at 399 (explaining that dismissal is appropriate when four factors support dismissal or where three factors "strongly" support dismissal).

Prior to dismissal on the court's own motion, a pro se plaintiff should be notified of the basis for dismissal and warned that dismissal is imminent. See Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; West Coast Theater Corp. v. City of Portland, 897 F.2d 1519, 1523 (9th Cir. 1990). That requirement has been met.

## Conclusion

A court has discretion to dismiss an action under Rule 41(b) with or without prejudice. <u>See</u> Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); <u>Al-Torki v. Kaempen</u>, 78 F.3d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1996). Considering all of the circumstances, this action is dismissed with prejudice.

## IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 21, 2015

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ANDREW J. WISTRICH United States Magistrate Judge